California Counties

A Look at Program Performance

Elizabeth G. Hill, Legislative Analyst ■ May 1998

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Introduction

Californians depend on counties for many important services. Counties prosecute, jail, and supervise most criminals; operate libraries; work to protect children from abuse; help residents with health, mental health, and substance abuse problems; fix potholes; and serve their residents in many other ways. For many programs, counties serve as local agents to implement the state's priorities. Counties frequently administer their programs under guidelines in state law.

Despite the importance of county programs, there is little information on their results, or "outcomes." This shortage of information makes it difficult for policymakers, residents, or county administrators to gauge a county's performance, or to observe changes in county performance levels over time.

This report compiles the best information available on county programs—and gives Californians a snapshot view of county performance. Whenever possible, this report displays information comparing the outcomes of county programs. For some programs, however, information on program outcomes is not available, and the report instead displays information on key county inputs (such as staffing levels or treatment slots) that we believe are associated with program success. Finally, for some programs, such as mental health, adult protection, and public health, we could not obtain satisfactory information on county outcomes *or* inputs. In these cases, the report does not provide information on the program.

In selecting the program outcome and input measures included in the report, we focused on measures where differences in county manage-

ment or policies explained at least part of the results. In many cases, we performed statistical analyses to examine the relative influence of demographic and economic factors, and other factors beyond a county's control.

This report's size reflects the small amount of information currently available on county performance. Given the data limitations and other extenuating factors, we caution the reader from assuming that differences in county *management* fully explain every county's performance. Specifically, a county's relative ranking under some of the report's performance measures may be influenced by the county's demographic characteristics and access to revenues. As we described in a companion report, *Why County Revenues Vary: State Laws and Local Conditions Affecting County Finance*, counties differ greatly in their revenues and program demand. In addition, because of information limitations, some important county activities are not included in this report, or are measured imperfectly.

While recognizing these limitations, we publish this report in the hope of launching a dialogue about the outcomes of important county programs. It is also our hope that someday Californians may have a more complete report on county program performance.

The report is presented in a graphical format, with chapters summarizing county program performance in four program areas: children's programs, social services and health, criminal justice, and roads and libraries. The charts typically summarize data for the state's 15 to 20 most populous counties, or the most populous counties for which reliable data are available. In addition, the data supplement in the back of the report includes available data for the remaining counties. The report's final chapter presents our findings on county performance as a whole.

Children's Programs

California's county-administered Children's Services and Foster Care programs are designed to protect children from abuse and neglect. When a case of abuse is confirmed, counties work to help the family in crisis and may place the child temporarily—or permanently—in another home.

While county child protection programs operate under many federal and state laws and guidelines, counties have some discretion over the level of services provided and how their programs are administered.

In our analysis, we relied primarily on data compiled by the Child Welfare Research Center at the University of California at Berkeley (in *Performance Indicators for Child Welfare Services in California: 1996*). We note that these measures pertain only to program activities *after the county has made the decision to remove the child from the parents' home*. If there were data on those cases where the county *did not* remove the child from the home after a report of abuse or neglect and then there was subsequent maltreatment, a more complete picture of county performance in child protection would be available.

The next three figures compare county performance in (1) moving children from temporary foster care to a permanent home within four years, (2) providing children in foster care with stable placements, and (3) reducing the likelihood that children who are reunified with their families will again be victims of abuse or neglect (that is, the rate of recidivism). A fourth figure combines county performance scores in the aforementioned areas of permanence, stability, and recidivism into an overall index of performance in child protection.

A Permanent Home Within Four Years

One of the priorities of child protection programs is to move children expeditiously from temporary foster care to a secure, stable ("permanent") home. This could be either reunification with the family, or placement with an adoptive family or guardian. Figure 1 compares county scores on a permanence index (as developed by the University of California at Berkeley Child Welfare Research Center) for children who first entered foster care in 1991-92 in 24 of the largest counties. Los Angeles County was dropped from the sample because of incomplete data. The index is constructed from data on children whose time in placement was primarily spent in nonrelative foster care. This is because many children placed in long-term foster care with relatives are in secure, stable homes.

Figure 1 indicates that there is a wide range in county performance in moving children from foster care to a permanent home, ranging from a high of 91 percent in Merced County to a low of 60 percent in San Francisco County. The statewide average is 75 percent.

Figure 1

Percent of Children in a Permanent Home Within Four Years of Entering Foster Care[a]

Statewide Average 75%

Merced	91%
San Mateo	89
Santa Clara	86
Shasta	82
Tulare	81
San Diego	81
Butte	81
Santa Cruz	80
Stanislaus	80
Riverside	78
Santa Barbara	77
Contra Costa	77
Ventura	76
Solano	75
San Luis Obispo	75
San Bernardino	74
Monterey	74
San Joaquin	73
Orange	71
Sacramento	71
Kern	68
Fresno	64
Alameda	63
San Francisco	60

[a] 1991-92 entries into foster care placed with nonrelatives. Excludes certain cases such as children who emancipate from the foster care system prior to the end of the four-year period.

How Often Do Children in Foster Care Change Homes?

It is widely accepted in the child development field that multiple foster care placements create instability, which can be detrimental to a child's development. Figure 2 reports the proportion of children experiencing no more than two different placements in their first spell in foster care, among those children who entered foster care in 1989-90 and remained in care for at least six years. The figure shows 14 large counties for which reliable data are available. Los Angeles County was dropped from the sample because of incomplete data.

San Francisco had the most stable foster care placements among these large counties, with 70 percent of children experiencing no more than two different placements in the first six years in foster care. By contrast, San Diego County had a rate of 40 percent, meaning 60 percent of their foster children experienced three or more placements in the first six years of their first spell in foster care.

We note that there may be an inverse relationship between the measures of permanence and stability. That is, counties that score well on the permanence index will have relatively few children remaining in foster care at the end of six years, but those children who do remain may be particularly difficult to maintain in a stable placement. This may result in a number of changes in their home placements. Finally, we note that the stability measure is calculated using data on both relative and nonrelative placements, and that children placed in nonrelative foster care tend to have less stable spells in foster care than is implied by the overall measure reported here.

Figure 2

Percent of Children with Two or Fewer Foster Home Placements in Six Years[a]



[a] 1989-90 entries into foster care.

How Often Do Children Reenter Foster Care?

Figure 3 shows the "recidivism" rates for the 25 largest counties. Specifically, this figure reports for those children who left foster care due to family reunification or placement with a guardian from 1993 through 1996, the proportion who reentered foster care within three years, or by the end of the sample period (December 31, 1996).

San Mateo County has the lowest recidivism rate among the 25 largest counties in California (8 percent); Shasta's recidivism rate is more than three times greater (25 percent). The statewide average is 16 percent.

Some care should be used in interpreting the recidivism measure. First, the extent to which the event that precipitated reentry involved abuse to the child is not known. Second, the measure reported here *understates* the true rate at which children reenter care within three years of reunification. This is because, for some children in the sample, three years had not elapsed between reunification and the end of the sample period. Finally, we note that the recidivism measure is calculated using data on both relative and nonrelative foster care placements. The reentry rates for children placed in nonrelative foster care tend to be higher than the rates for children in relative placements, so the measure reported here *understates* the reentry rate for children in nonrelative placements.

Figure 3

Foster Care Recidivism Rate[a]



San Mateo	8%	Solano	17%
San Francisco	10	Kern	17
Santa Clara	12	Monterey	17
San Diego	12	San Bernardino	17
Merced	12	Los Angeles	18
San Joaquin	13	Butte	19
Orange	14	San Luis Obispo	19
Riverside	14	Contra Costa	20
Ventura	14	Stanislaus	20
Santa Cruz	15	Tulare	20
Statewide Average	**16**	Santa Barbara	21
Alameda	16	Sacramento	21
Fresno	16	Shasta	25

[a] Proportion of those children who left foster care between 1993 and 1996 due to family reunification or placement with a guardian, but who reentered foster care within three years.

Overall Child Protection Index

It is useful to compare simultaneously, county performance on the measures of permanence and recidivism. A few counties—in particular San Mateo, but also Merced, Santa Clara, and San Diego—do well on both measures. These counties appear to have particularly effective child protection programs based on these measures: they move children quickly from foster care to a permanent home, and relatively few children reunified with their families return to foster care. On the other hand, Sacramento and Kern Counties are below average on both measures: children in these counties move to a permanent home relatively slowly, and a relatively high proportion of those children reunified with their families return to foster care.

Figure 4 compares county scores on a child protection index that combines the permanence, stability, and recidivism performance measures. A county's index score is the weighted average of its scores in each performance area, relative to the highest performing county. In other words, if a county had the highest score on each of the three performance measures, then its child protection index score would be 100 percent; if the county's score in each area were 75 percent of the highest county score, then its index score would be 75 percent.

We weighted performance in recidivism twice as heavily as performance in each of the areas of permanence and stability because we believe that recidivism—which is related directly to the act, or threat of, abuse or neglect—represents a particularly important program outcome.

San Mateo County had the highest overall level of performance in child protection and clearly stood out among the 14 counties shown in Figure 4, scoring at or near the top in permanence, stability, and recidivism. Sacramento County had the lowest overall level of performance.

Figure 4

Overall Child Protection Index[a]

1996



[a] Counties' weighted average score on permanence, stability, and recidivism.

Children's Programs Conclusion

Measuring differences in child well-being due to county service interventions is a very challenging task. The best available performance measures reflect the actions of a county *after* it decided to remove a child from the parents' home. Currently, there is relatively little information about the quality of county "front-end" decisions. If there were data on subsequent maltreatment in the cases where the county *did not* remove the child from the home after a report of abuse or neglect, then a more complete snapshot of county performance in child protection would be available.

We note that county performance may be influenced, to some extent, by demographic variables that are beyond the control of the county. However, in our statistical analysis we found no significant relationship between county performance in child protection and demographic variables, including poverty, unemployment, crime, unwed births, ethnicity, and median county income.

Social Services and Health

California counties administer many social service and health programs for low-income families and individuals. These programs include: cash grants to families with children (California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids [CalWORKs] program), cash aid to indigent adults without children (general assistance), mental health, drug and alcohol treatment services, child support collections, public health, indigent health, and Medi-Cal eligibility determinations.

For many of these programs it is difficult to gauge county performance because cross-county information is not available. In other cases, the level of county performance is difficult to ascertain because program outcomes are largely determined by policies or decisions made by the state or federal government—or other factors beyond the county's control. As we discussed earlier, we have sought to exclude measures where most of the cause of the variation was beyond a county's control.

In reviewing county social service and health program responsibilities, we found three programs where reasonably good performance information is available: CalWORKs, child support collections, and drug and alcohol addiction treatment. While limited in scope, the information presented in this chapter provides an interesting perspective on county success in maintaining the state's safety net for those in need.

Where Are Welfare Rates Declining Fastest?

Federal and state welfare reforms have focused increasing attention on moving families from welfare to self-sufficiency. To measure the effectiveness of county efforts to promote this goal, ideally information would be available on the "work readiness" (education and employment history) of each family on the CalWORKs program, and each family's change in income after leaving the program. Because such data do not exist, Figure 5 provides a "second-best" measurement of county success. Specifically, Figure 5 shows for the 20 largest counties, the decline in welfare dependency rates between April 1995 (the statewide peak in CalWORKs caseload) and October 1997. During this period, CalWORKs cases dropped by 20 percent statewide, but there was variation among counties.

Ideally, the state would like to know how much of the differences shown in Figure 5 reflects the relative effectiveness of county programs, rather than other factors outside county control. The limited information available prevents a precise assessment. Nevertheless, our statistical analysis found that changes in the local economies did *not* account for the differences in caseload reductions. In addition, although differences in funding for state employment services explained about 40 percent of Figure 5's variation, accounting for these funding differences seldom changed the rank order in which counties are listed in Figure 5. Accordingly, we conclude that a significant portion of the variation among county declines in welfare dependency rates probably results from differences in (1) relative work-readiness of county caseloads and (2) county program management.

Recently, the state made major changes to this welfare program, including giving counties new fiscal incentives and increased funding for employment services. Given the magnitude of these changes, future county performance may well be different than the recent past.

Figure 5

Percent Reduction in CalWORKs Cases Per 1,000 Population

April 1995 Through October 1997



Collecting Child Support

When a noncustodial parent fails to pay court-ordered child support, the custodial parent may turn to the county district attorney for assistance. Such child support collection services are available to welfare families and nonwelfare families. Child support collections on behalf of welfare recipients are used to reduce state, county, and federal public assistance costs, as well as help move a family off welfare. Collections made on behalf of nonwelfare clients are distributed directly to the clients.

Our review of this program found that county methodology for closing collection "cases" varies throughout the state, as does the income of noncustodial parents. In order to develop a fair index of county program success, therefore, we limited our review to cases in which the family receives CalWORKs aid. Limiting our review offered two advantages: (1) a more reliable data base and (2) there tends to be less variation among noncustodial parent incomes.

Figure 6 compares the 25 largest counties on an index of their performance in child support collection in 1996-97. The index measures each county's collections per case on behalf of families receiving CalWORKs, relative to the collections of the best performing county. For example, the county with the highest collections (Sonoma) receives a score of 100 percent, and a county with a score of 75 percent would indicate that the county had 75 percent of the collections of the best performing county. Figure 6 indicates that there was a wide range in county performance. Four counties (Sacramento, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Los Angeles) had less than half the rate of collections of the highest performing county (Sonoma). While the findings in Figure 6 pertain to CalWORKs cases, our review suggests that county success in collecting child support for nonwelfare families is likely to be similar.

Figure 6

Child Support Collections Performance Index

1996-97



75 Percent or More

Sonoma	100%
Ventura	92
Santa Barbara	86
Merced	85
San Mateo	80
Imperial	79
Shasta	77
Fresno	77

50 to 74 Percent

Stanislaus	74%
Tulare	73
Monterey	73
Santa Clara	73
Orange	71
Butte	66
Contra Costa	64
San Francisco	64
Kern	63
Alameda	61
Solano	59
San Diego	56
San Joaquin	54

49 Percent or Less

Sacramento	40%
Riverside	38
San Bernardino	34
Los Angeles	19

Helping People with Addictions

Counties offer numerous substance abuse treatment services, ranging from intensive short-term detoxification to longer-term outpatient counseling and treatment. The state Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs collects program data from each county, including the number of publicly funded treatment "slots" available. A client occupies a slot when receiving treatment services.

Figure 7 shows the number of treatment slots per 10,000 population for the 15 largest counties in April 1997. A variety of factors affect the number of treatment slots, including the amount of state and federal funds allocated to a county for drug treatment, the amount of county funds allocated for drug treatment, the availability of services, the level of demand for certain types of treatment, and the willingness of providers to create new treatment programs in a county or geographic area. We note that some of these factors are beyond the control of county drug and alcohol programs. Furthermore, while the number of treatment slots does not measure program performance, it is an important "input" variable that may be related to program outcomes.

The figure shows San Francisco County with the highest treatment capacity among the large counties, with 54 slots per 10,000 population. In contrast, Orange and San Mateo Counties each have 11 slots. The average among the large counties is 22 slots, while the statewide average (excluding the three smallest counties) is 28.

Between 1995 and 1997, 14 of the 58 counties reduced the number of treatment slots per 10,000 residents. Of the counties shown in Figure 7, Orange reduced its treatment capacity the most, cutting nearly a third of its slots. Santa Clara, Contra Costa, and San Mateo Counties also reduced treatment slots, all by less than 10 percent. In contrast, Fresno County more than doubled its treatment capacity, while Los Angeles County increased slots by 78 percent.

Figure 7

Drug and Alcohol Treatment Slots[a]

April 1997



[a] Includes all types of treatment services.

Waiting for Substance Abuse Services

When people needing help with drug or alcohol addictions must wait lengthy periods of time for treatment, their health may worsen and some may engage in criminal activity. Factors affecting wait time in a county include the number of treatment slots, the demand for each type of treatment, and the length of time clients remain in treatment. Thus, while the length of time waiting for treatment services does not measure the effectiveness of county treatment programs directly, it is a useful indicator of the accessibility of county treatment programs.

During April 1997, 3,800 people statewide moved into treatment programs after waiting an average of 20 days for services. As Figure 8 shows, wait times ranged from 102 days in Kern County to less than 6 days in Orange County. It is important to note that the length of waiting lists varies by treatment types. People who moved into a residential detoxification program waited an average of four days for services. In contrast, the wait for a narcotic treatment program slot was much longer, which in some counties contributed to a longer overall wait time for services. Kern County, for example, moved 7 people (who waited an average of nearly two years) into the narcotic treatment program, and 72 people (who waited an average of 42 days) into other types of treatments.

Finally, we note that while this measure is useful in considering county program performance, it does not accurately gauge county program *outcomes*. It could be, for example, that a county's waiting list is long because it has a good outreach program and very successful treatment results that tend to attract more clients.

Figure 8

Waiting Time to Receive Substance Abuse Services

April 1997



Drug and Alcohol Deaths

Because of the detrimental effects of drug and alcohol addictions on people's health, capacity to earn a living, and ability to maintain shelter, some people die from untreated drug and alcohol addictions. Figure 9 illustrates an outcome measure for county drug and alcohol programs: the average annual number of drug- and alcohol-related deaths per 100,000 population from 1993 through 1995.

The figure shows that drug-related death rates ranged from over 20 deaths per 100,000 in San Francisco to less than 5 deaths in Santa Clara. For alcohol-related deaths, San Francisco had the highest rate, 18 deaths per 100,000 population, while Santa Clara again had the lowest death rate.

We examined the data regarding drug-related deaths in more detail (time limitations precluded a similar review of alcohol-related deaths). We tested whether factors such as poverty, treatment funding, and the number of treatment slots influence the drug-related death rate. We found that per capita treatment funding and the number of county-provided treatment slots had a positive relationship with the death rate—in other words, the greater the number of treatment slots and per capita funding, the higher the drug-related death rate. The most likely explanation for this finding is that counties increase treatment capacity in response to problems caused by substance abuse, such as a high death rate due to drugs or alcohol. We did not find evidence that the availability of treatment reduced the death rate, but because data on death rates were only available through 1995, we were unable to assess the effects of increased treatment capacity over time. Much more analysis (including studies that cover several years and control for other variables) would be needed before drawing any conclusions.

Figure 9

Drug and Alcohol Deaths
Average Number of Deaths
1993 Through 1995



Social Services and Health Conclusion

The preceding figures displayed information on three important county social service and health program responsibilities (CalWORKs, child support, and drug and alcohol treatment). In reviewing the information, we note that some counties, particularly Santa Clara, San Mateo, and Orange, regularly score well, whereas Sacramento, Kern, San Bernardino, and Los Angeles Counties rate lower. It is important to recognize, however, that the data are not adequate to delineate how much of these differences reflect variations in county program management, demographics, and other factors. Similarly, the data collected often are measures of "inputs" rather than program outcomes.

What information does California need to collect to allow a better examination of program success? In general, we find that counties (or the state) already collect detailed information on the number of people receiving services, but little information on program *outcomes*—such as the change in income of people leaving welfare, or the number of relapses experienced by people provided drug or alcohol treatment. In addition, because the information on people receiving services seldom is presented in detailed form, it is difficult to determine the extent to which differences result from variations in county administration, or the characteristics of the caseload. In the case of welfare programs, for instance, it would be helpful to have data on recipients' work readiness. In the case of drug and alcohol programs, it would be helpful to have data on the recipients' level of drug or alcohol use, level and severity of criminal activity, and ability to work. Absent increased efforts to collect data, it will continue to be difficult to gauge how well counties are performing at their social service and health tasks.

Criminal Justice

Much of California's system of criminal justice is a county responsibility. While city police arrest most offenders, counties:

- Book people arrested into county jails.
- Prosecute and, often, defend or finance the defense of people charged with crimes.
- Share with the state the responsibility for funding and operating the trial courts.
- Incarcerate in county jails most offenders, and supervise offenders released to the community on probation.
- Provide police protection to the public living outside of city boundaries.

Although the programs counties operate are crucial to California's criminal justice system, there is little information on county program outcomes. This is because, in part, central missions and goals of most programs have not been clearly defined. In addition, some criminal activities within counties are heavily affected by actions of others, particularly cities within the counties, and demographic factors beyond a county's control. For these reasons, it was difficult to assemble information assessing how well counties are operating their criminal justice programs. In this chapter, we review (1) data on key county criminal program *inputs and activities*, and (2) some performance measures that, while less than perfect, are the best that are available.

Which Counties Have the Most Crime?

Counties operate many programs designed to make the public safe. These include crime prevention programs, law enforcement suppression, incarceration, and rehabilitation programs. The ultimate success of all criminal justice programs should show up in the best known criminal justice performance measure: *the crime rate*—the number of reported crimes in a given population. In California, the generally accepted crime rate is the *California Crime Index*, which includes four types of violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and assault) and two property crimes (burglary and motor vehicle theft).

Using crime rates as a performance measure of county criminal justice systems has significant limitations. First, crime rates reflect residents' reports of crimes to law enforcement agencies, and studies have shown residents generally underreport crime. Second, law enforcement agency data often are not audited for accuracy. Third, some factors related to crime, such as the demography of the population, are not controllable by counties, and other factors, such as the availability of jobs, are affected by entities other than just the counties. Finally, one of the most significant forces in fighting crime—city police departments—are not under the control of the county at all. Despite these limitations, we believe that crime rates should be considered when assessing the performance of county criminal justice programs. This is because the data tell something about the overall success of county programs (for example, prevention and rehabilitation) which contribute to the level of crime in a county.

The 1996 crime rates for large counties are shown in Figure 10. For purposes of comparison, we grouped counties based on their extent of urbanization and per capita income. As Figure 10 shows, there is substantial variation within each of the categories.

Figure 10

County Crime Rates

1996



Where Has Violent Crime Fallen Most?

Violent crime rates—which include murder, rape, robbery, and assault—have significant negative consequences to society. Violent crime rates have been declining nationally and in California. While the previous figure provided a one-year snapshot of crime, the facing figure shows the change in violent crime over the past ten years.

Ideally, to assess individual county performance, changes in violent crime rates would be examined in conjunction with factors that are within the control of the county (such as county probation and sheriff activities, and prevention and rehabilitation programs). The analysis would exclude factors over which counties have no control (such as demographics and the activity of city police departments). Data limitations, however, preclude such an analysis. Thus, Figure 11 compares overall changes in violent crime among large counties.

As the figure shows, violent crime in the state declined over ten years by about 8 percent. Violent crime dropped in most counties. Declines among the large counties ranged from 1.4 percent (Alameda) to 46 percent (San Mateo). In counties where the violent crime rate rose, the increases varied from less than 1 percent (San Francisco) to 17 percent (Santa Clara). The two counties that experienced the most significant decline and increase—San Mateo and Santa Clara, respectively—had relatively low violent crime rates at the beginning of the period of comparison.

Figure 11

Changes in Violent Crime Rates

1986 Through 1996

Statewide Decline 7.9%

Declines of More than 10%

Contra Costa
Kern
Riverside
San Mateo
Ventura

Declines of 5% to 10%

Los Angeles
Sacramento
San Bernardino

Declines of Less than 5%

Alameda
Orange

Increases

Fresno
San Diego
San Francisco
San Joaquin
Santa Clara

When Jails Are Crowded

Counties are responsible for incarcerating most sentenced offenders in California, as well as some offenders awaiting trial. Almost all jails in large counties are overcrowded and are under court-imposed limits on the number of people who may be held at one time. In general, this jail overcrowding stems from the failure of counties to build jail beds to accommodate (1) population growth, (2) increases in the number of people arrested, and (3) the reduced capacity of other facilities, such as institutions for the mentally ill.

Ideally, to assess county performance, the likelihood of a released offender (or person awaiting a trial) committing another crime would be examined. Because these data are not available, Figure 12 displays for the 15 largest counties, information pertaining to *one* aspect of county jail programs: county capacity to house offenders and people arrested. Specifically, the left side of the figure shows the number of people (per 10,000 people in the county's population) whom the county released from jail due to lack of jail space. While there is considerable variation among counties in this rate of release, counties statewide released about 29,000 inmates each month in 1997—7,000 inmates awaiting trial and 22,000 inmates before the end of their sentences. Some jails report that sentenced inmates served less than 20 percent of their sentences before being released due to jail overcrowding.

The right side of the figure reflects another measure relating to jail overcrowding: the rate at which individuals released from jail before trial (or who were never placed into jail due to overcrowding) failed to appear in court and have not been located ("unserved warrants"). Statewide, there are more than 2.6 million cases of these failures to appear in court. Ten percent of these cases involve felony charges.

Figure 12

County Early Jail Releases and Failures to Appear in Court

(Per 10,000 Population)
1997

	Early Jail Releases	Failures To Appear in Court
Alameda	NA	267
Contra Costa	NA	400
Fresno	20	1,611
Kern	34	707
Los Angeles	43	1,074
Orange	66	807
Riverside	1	1,259
Sacramento	12	697
San Bernardino	NA	399
San Diego	318	200
San Francisco	NA	7
San Joaquin	33	NA
San Mateo	NA	NA
Santa Clara	NA	NA
Ventura	NA	1,230

Sheriffs' Services

Sheriffs are elected county officials with responsibility for several law enforcement functions. Along with their 18,000 sworn peace officers and almost 12,000 civilian employees, sheriffs provide police services to the unincorporated parts of counties, operate county jails, and, in many counties, act as bailiffs in local trial courts. Finally, many county sheriffs contract with cities to provide law enforcement services within city boundaries.

Ideally, to assess the performance of county sheriff operations, the relative success of the county sheriff in preventing or deterring criminal activity through law enforcement and community-based anticrime activities would be examined. Given that such cross-county information is not available, the facing figure shows a key county criminal justice program "input" related to the sheriff—the number of sheriff's deputies per 10,000 population in the area served by sheriff patrol (residents of the county's unincorporated areas and contract cities).

As Figure 13 illustrates, for the 20 largest counties, the variation in number of sheriff deputies is considerable. In general, we find little correlation between the size of a county and the number of deputies.

Figure 13

Sheriff Deputies

1996



Supervising Offenders

Probation departments supervise adult offenders in the community, and juvenile offenders in detention and in the community.

Specifically, counties supervise almost three-quarters of all adults convicted of a felony. In some cases, this supervisory role begins directly after conviction; in other cases, counties supervise adult offenders after they are released from county jail. In 1996, county probation departments supervised almost 290,000 adult offenders.

County probation departments have broader responsibilities with regard to juvenile offenders. In addition to supervising juvenile offenders released into the community, county probation officers supervise the detention of most juvenile offenders. Typically, young offenders are detained in their homes, group or foster care homes, juvenile halls, ranches, or camps.

Ideally, to examine county probation department performance, the recidivism data of adult and juvenile offenders who have been on probation would be examined. Such information, however, is not available at the state level. Thus, Figure 14 provides information for the 15 largest counties on a key program input—the adult and juvenile caseloads per probation officer. In general, counties where probation officers supervise many adults or juveniles are less likely to provide the type of individual attention necessary to alter future criminal behavior. In reviewing the information on probation officers caseload, we note that some counties that released many people from jail early offer a higher than average level of probation supervision (San Diego, Orange, and Los Angeles).

Figure 14

Probation Officers Caseload

1996



Criminal Justice Conclusion

As we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there is little information available on county program outcomes. Although some counties have attempted to develop better data and information to assess outcomes and improve business practices, the efforts and successes have varied.

The most notable measure of criminal justice program success that California does not have is the *recidivism rate* of criminal offenders—the rate at which offenders released from custody commit new criminal offenses. Recidivism rates indicate how successful county criminal justice systems are at rehabilitating offenders (for example, through drug treatment, employment, or education programs) and deterring them from committing new crimes (by punishing and dissuading). Although many county programs collect recidivism data, the data are generally of poor quality and almost impossible to compare across jurisdictions. Collection of a consistent, uniform set of offender recidivism data would go a long way to measuring criminal justice program performance.

In reviewing the information on criminal justice programs in this chapter, some patterns emerge. Few counties that consistently scored well in terms of county criminal justice program inputs (jail space, failure to appear in court, number of sheriffs, and probation officers caseload) failed to post a decline in violent crime rates over the last decade. Of counties with declining violent crime rates, San Mateo was notable with a 46 percent decline. Our data show that San Mateo had virtually no early releases from jail or failures to appear in court, and a very low level of caseloads assigned to their probation officers. Conversely, Fresno County ranked poorly in terms of each of the public safety input measures, has a high crime rate, and posted a 7.3 percent increase in violent crime over the last decade.

Roads and Libraries

While many county programs address specific crises, or help people in need, counties also administer programs that benefit all Californians on a regular basis. For example, counties build and maintain roads, operate libraries, administer elections, provide animal control, and inspect restaurants for sanitary conditions.

Ideally, Californians would have access to cross-county information measuring outcomes of all of these programs. Unfortunately, few such data are available. This final chapter focuses on two county program areas where reasonably good information does exist: roads and libraries.

In the case of both of these programs, counties have significant authority to adjust the level of services they provide their residents. For example, counties may add a lane to a county road, open a library branch office, and adjust their book purchasing or road maintenance budgets. Counties typically finance their road programs with state subventions of gas tax revenues, and their libraries with property taxes or other county general purpose revenues.

How Safe Are County Roads?

In a state as mobile as California, traffic safety is a major concern. California counties are responsible for monitoring the safety of all roads in their unincorporated areas (except state highways and freeways), and making improvements to increase safety. For example, counties: install lights, signals, and signs; mark lane lines; build additional lanes; and correct dangerous curves and road conditions.

While county road safety improvements play an important role in promoting traffic safety, a county's traffic accident rate is related to other factors as well. These factors include driver behavior, the availability of alternate routes, climate, and the level of traffic enforcement. All in all, county road safety improvements probably lower a county's accident rate at the margin, and help explain some of the large differences among county accident rates.

Figure 15 displays the traffic accident rate on county roads for the 20 counties with the most miles traveled on county roads. The figure indicates whether each county's accident rate is above, at, or below the statewide average. Non-injury-causing accidents are not reflected in the figure. The accident rate of the highest county on the figure (Sacramento) is four and a half times that of the lowest county on the figure (Santa Clara).

Figure 15

Traffic Accident Rate
Injuries and Fatalities on County Roads
1994 and 1995

Counties With High Accident Rates

Sacramento
Santa Cruz
Sonoma
Los Angeles

Counties With Average Accident Rates

El Dorado
Kern
Riverside
Alameda
San Joaquin
San Diego
Contra Costa
San Bernardino
Fresno
Santa Barbara

Counties With Low Accident Rates

Tulare
Stanislaus
Orange
Butte
Monterey
Santa Clara

Note: Counties are listed in order of accident rates, per vehicle mile traveled.

Road Conditions Ahead

In addition to making traffic safety improvements, counties are responsible for maintaining most roads in their unincorporated areas. To maintain a road's surface quality, counties periodically add seal coats and repave. When pavement is not well maintained: riding comfort is diminished; vehicles must travel at reduced speeds and may incur damage; and road conditions deteriorate rapidly—often resulting in higher overall road maintenance costs in the long run.

Ideally, each county (or transportation planning agency) would compile comparable pavement quality information. While such data are not regularly compiled, in 1996 the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) inspected pavement conditions on segments of over 1,000 randomly selected county roads, excluding minor residential streets. These road segments averaged one to two miles in length. In the case of 16 counties, we believe Caltrans inspected enough roads to estimate the overall quality of county pavement conditions.

As Figure 16 displays, in six counties more than 25 percent of county roads were in poor or very poor condition. In these cases, the pavement is so deteriorated that it has large potholes, deep cracks, or signs of pavement distress across at least 50 percent of the surface. In contrast, less than 10 percent of the roads in four other counties are in such a deteriorated condition. In reviewing the data, we note that the quality of road pavement often appears to be correlated with better road safety.

Figure 16

What Percent of County Maintained Roads Are in Poor Condition?

1996

More Than 25%

Yolo
Los Angeles
Contra Costa
San Bernardino
Imperial
Sacramento

10% to 25%

Yuba
Riverside
Sutter
Sonoma
Kern
Ventura

Less Than 10%

San Joaquin
Santa Clara
Fresno
Orange

Note: Counties are listed in order of percentage of roads in poor condition.

Is the Library Open?

Most counties have a public library department organized under the state's County Free Library Law. These libraries provide services to county residents not served by a city or special district library.

Counties have great discretion in operating their libraries. Some counties devote most of their library resources to a downtown library. Other counties maintain many branch offices and send bookmobiles to rural areas. Because of these differences, Figure 17 provides three different "looks" at library accessibility for the 15 largest county free library systems:

- ***Number of Library Outlets***. This measure is an indicator of library convenience.
- ***Weekly Service Hours, Per 10,000 Residents***. This measure reflects the total hours per week the public can access library resources.
- ***Number of Library Staff, Per 10,000 Residents***. This measure provides two indirect indicators of county library service levels. First, more staff can mean that residents receive faster and more in-depth responses to their requests. Second, the number of staff provides information about the type of library outlets operated. For example, a county with three tiny libraries open sporadically may show more "service hours" and "outlets" than a county with a major library open all day. The county with the large library, however, probably will have more staff.

As Figure 17 indicates, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara Counties provide high levels of service in terms of library staff and hours. Fresno County, in contrast, has a lower level of staff, but more outlets.

Figure 17

Library Service

1996-97

	Outlets	Weekly Service Hours Per 10,000 Residents	Staff Per 10,000 Residents
Alameda	12	7	
Contra Costa	26	10	
Fresno	43	9	
Kern	28	14	
Los Angeles	89	11	
Orange	28	10	
San Bernardino	30	10	
San Diego	34	12	
San Francisco	29	14	
San Mateo	13	19	
Santa Clara	11	13	
Solano	6	6	
Stanislaus	13	13	
Tulare	17	13	
Ventura	16	10	
State Average	**14**	**13**	

Books in Circulation

County library systems provide many services to meet the information and reading needs of its residents: books, periodicals, reference materials, Internet access, presentations, and more. While there are little data available comparing counties on this full range of services, county free library systems report information on the number of books and other materials residents check out. We believe the level of materials circulated serves as a good indicator of resident satisfaction and library accessibility.

Figure 18 compares counties on the basis of annual circulation per resident served. In general, residents check out more books in counties where libraries have more staff and are open longer, such as Santa Clara and San Francisco. Some county library systems achieve high circulation levels, however, with limited library availability. Solano and Alameda County libraries, for example, both report circulating about six documents per resident even though they have low or modest levels of library operation, staffing, and outlets.

Figure 18 also provides information on county library expenditures per document circulated. While most county costs are in the range of $2.75 to $3.25 per document, some county costs are considerably higher. These higher costs could be due to higher levels of non-circulation-related library services, higher staff salaries, lower efficiency, or other factors.

Figure 18

Annual Library Circulation

1996-97

Roads and Libraries Conclusion

Given the wide range of general services that counties provide their residents, it is unfortunate that data limitations permit inclusion of only four figures summarizing county performance in two program areas: roads and libraries. Ideally, data would be available on county elections, planning and building permit issuance, transit availability, restaurant inspection responsibilities, and more. We also would have liked to include more complete information on county roads and library programs, such as road congestion, travel times, and library customer satisfaction. With more complete information, county residents and policymakers would be better able to gauge the quality of county services.

In reviewing the information presented in this chapter, we find that Orange and Santa Clara Counties consistently rate highly. Road quality in Sacramento and Los Angeles Counties appears to be particularly poor. In Fresno County, road quality appears high, while library services are very low.

Conclusion

To our knowledge, this small report represents California's first compilation of broad, cross-county program performance measures. While acknowledging the limitations of this report—that is, some program measures are imperfect, others are missing, and others may reflect policies that a county has already corrected—it is instructive to review the data as a whole to see if any trends are apparent. If some counties regularly performed better than others, the factors which contributed to these positive outcomes could be examined.

Based on our review and discussions with counties, we developed three plausible—yet overlapping—theories to explain why some counties might perform better than others. Specifically:

Theory One: Counties With Higher Per Capita General Purpose Revenues Might Perform Better. Counties with higher per capita general purpose revenues (money counties may spend on programs of their own choosing) have greater ability to expand programs to meet demand. As we discuss in *Why County Revenues Vary: State Laws and Local Conditions Affecting County Finance*, counties receive very different levels of general purpose revenues.

Theory Two: Counties With a Greater Percentage of High Income Residents Might Perform Better. Counties with more high income residents may face less demand for criminal justice, indigent health, and social service programs. This may allow a county to "do a better job" administering these services to a smaller proportion of their residents, and leave more funds to pay for other county services, such as roads and libraries. In addition, counties with more high income residents may find

it easier to raise fees, taxes, or assessments. Even if these additional funds are not available for general program purposes, the extra funds may relieve fiscal pressures on a county and increase fiscal flexibility.

Theory Three: Counties With A Smaller Proportion of Residents Needing Services Might Perform Better. Because of differences in local economies, demographics, and other factors, county program caseloads differ in size. Differences in county caseload sizes do not always reflect differences in resident incomes. Counties with lower demand for indigent health, social services, and criminal justice services may find it easier to achieve successful outcomes.

What We Found

We examined the performance data in conjunction with information on county general purpose revenues, resident income, unemployment, and caseload size. In many cases, our sample size was too small to perform a statistical analysis, so our comments are drawn from a qualitative evaluation of the data, unless stated otherwise.

Overall, we found some support for the theory that counties with more high income residents perform better. Specifically, the two counties that typically ranked the highest in our report (San Mateo and Santa Clara), as well as two counties which ranked highly but for which data were limited (Marin and San Francisco), stand out as the state's counties with the wealthiest residents. We note that three of these four counties also have relatively low social service and criminal justice program caseloads (San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Marin), and three counties appear to have higher than average per capita general purpose revenues (San Mateo, Marin, and San Francisco).

Beyond these four very wealthy counties, however, we found that the relationship between county performance and resident income, per capita general purpose revenues, and caseload became much less clear.

That is, some counties with low resources, poor people, and high caseloads performed much better than would be expected. Examined statistically, we found only one measure in which program performance correlated positively with income or county revenues—library circulation.

Other Findings

Virtually every county performed well in at least one program area. For example, although Merced and Fresno Counties have low per capita general purpose revenues, rising crime rates, and high unemployment rates, both counties showed considerable success in their child protection, welfare, and child support programs. Los Angeles and Sacramento Counties posted large declines in the rate of violent crime, and provided a relatively high level of sheriff and/or probation services. San Diego, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties rated well across several measures, a level of performance which is particularly notable given the very low level of per capita general purpose revenues available to these counties. Alameda and Contra Costa Counties had more success than many other urban counties in collecting child support payments and in road safety.

What Can Be Concluded From the Report?

While this report poses more questions than it answers, the process of developing this report resulted in three conclusions.

First, in order to undertake a more complete review of county program performance, and to "sort out" the influences of caseload characteristics and other variables, California needs more information about county programs. Throughout the book we identify the type of information needed and the appendix provides a summary of the information needed to assess county performance in administering

programs of statewide interest. We note that in several program areas—drug and alcohol, mental health, and child welfare services—additional data collection efforts are underway.

Second, there is probably some relationship between county program performance and resident income, county revenues, and caseload size. The extent of this relationship, however, will not be apparent until the state has better measures of county program performance.

Finally, quality county program management matters. In developing this report, we found many examples of exemplary county efforts. Sometimes, counties achieved considerable program successes despite significant resource limitations and caseload demands. Given the importance to California of successful county programs—these efforts are particularly commendable.

Appendix: Information Needed to Assess Performance

Throughout the report, we identify information gaps that impede California's ability to evaluate county program performance. Some of these information gaps pertain to programs of primarily *local* interest, such as libraries and roads. In other cases, however, additional information is needed to assess county performance in implementing programs of significant *statewide* interest. Below, we list information (in addition to that contained in this report) that—if collected in a consistent manner—would significantly improve the Legislature's ability to assess county performance in administering programs of statewide interest.

We note that, in some cases, imposing new county reporting requirements would create a state-reimbursable "mandate" under Article XIII B of the California Constitution. In other cases, however, the Legislature could require additional information from counties as a condition for the receipt of state funding, such as funds for operation of juvenile detention "camps," child support incentive payments, or subventions under the California "Citizens Option for Public Safety" program.

Children's Programs

- How many cases of subsequent maltreatment occur in situations where the county did *not* remove the child from the home after a report of abuse or neglect? (The new Child Welfare Services Case Management System might capture such information in the future.)

Social Services and Health

- How "work-ready" are CalWORKs recipients when they enter and exit the program?

- What is the level of income for CalWORKs recipients who leave aid?
- For CalWORKs recipients who remain on aid, what is their level of income?
- How effective are county drug or alcohol treatment services, as measured by "before" and "after" data for clients' frequency of substance abuse, level of criminal activity, employment status, living arrangements, and health status?
- How effective are county mental health services as measured by improvements in client functional levels?
- What are the immunization rates for pre-school children?

Criminal Justice

- How often do people released from a county detention facility (or who are cited and released from custody) commit new offenses?
- How often do people being supervised on probation commit new offenses?
- How successful are county crime prevention and early intervention programs at reducing future criminality, particularly among juveniles?
- How accurate are the crime data that the county reports to state Department of Justice (this could be determined through a regular audit process)?

Data Supplement

The following four tables display the data used to generate the figures in this report. Whenever possible, the tables include comparable data for the state's small counties.

County Data Supplement—Children's Programs

County	Figure Number 1	2	3	4
Alameda	63%	50%	16%	60%
Alpine	100	NA	8	NA
Amador	83	NA	6	NA
Butte	81	NA	19	NA
Calaveras	90	NA	18	NA
Colusa	46	NA	18	NA
Contra Costa	77	52	20	59
Del Norte	65	NA	11	NA
El Dorado	64	NA	21	NA
Fresno	64	55	16	61
Glenn	73	NA	10	NA
Humboldt	80	NA	18	NA
Imperial	83	NA	21	NA
Inyo	85	NA	0	NA
Kern	68	58	17	62
Kings	78	NA	20	NA
Lake	71	NA	5	NA
Lassen	66	NA	28	NA
Los Angeles	NA	NA	18	NA
Madera	64	NA	12	NA
Marin	82	NA	19	NA
Mariposa	75	NA	13	NA
Mendocino	64	NA	17	NA
Merced	91	41	12	71
Modoc	50	NA	NA	NA
Mono	60	NA	9	NA
Monterey	74	NA	17	NA
Napa	67	NA	22	NA
Nevada	76	NA	25	NA
Orange	71	45	14	63
Placer	77	NA	10	NA
Plumas	75	NA	38	NA
Riverside	78	45	14	65
Sacramento	71	47	21	55
San Benito	53	NA	16	NA
San Bernardino	74	55	17	62
San Diego	81	40	12	69
San Francisco	60	70	10	80
San Joaquin	73	48	13	68
San Luis Obispo	75	NA	19	NA
San Mateo	89	65	8	98
Santa Barbara	77	NA	21	NA
Santa Clara	86	54	12	75
Santa Cruz	80	NA	15	NA
Shasta	82	NA	25	NA
Sierra	100	NA	15	NA
Siskiyou	75	NA	25	NA
Solano	75	NA	17	NA
Sonoma	70	NA	21	NA
Stanislaus	80	NA	20	NA
Sutter	74	NA	14	NA
Tehama	86	NA	18	NA
Trinity	77	NA	15	NA
Tulare	81	NA	20	NA
Tuolumne	41	NA	21	NA
Ventura	76	NA	14	NA
Yolo	79	NA	17	NA
Yuba	86	NA	24	NA

NA: Data are not available, not applicable, or otherwise not suitable for inclusion within the supplement.

County Data Supplement—Social Services

	Figure Number					
County	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9a**	**9b**
Alameda	-23%	61%	15	29	9.5	9.8
Alpine	-50	NA	169	0	NA	NA
Amador	-17	NA	15	0	NA	NA
Butte	-19	66	43	1	9.6	10.9
Calaveras	-18	NA	25	0	NA	NA
Colusa	-40	NA	30	2	NA	NA
Contra Costa	-20	64	20	22	7.5	8.0
Del Norte	-17	NA	70	0	NA	NA
El Dorado	-24	NA	12	13	NA	NA
Fresno	-25	77	38	45	NA	12.8
Glenn	-26	NA	47	0	NA	NA
Humboldt	-18	NA	15	17	NA	NA
Imperial	3	79	24	5	NA	NA
Inyo	-7	NA	0	NA	NA	NA
Kern	-16	63	39	102	8.3	11.9
Kings	-21	NA	15	12	NA	NA
Lake	-18	NA	23	4	NA	NA
Lassen	-37	NA	44	0	NA	NA
Los Angeles	-17	19	16	12	8.1	11.6
Madera	-18	NA	29	2	NA	NA
Marin	-27	NA	17	20	7.5	10.5
Mariposa	-18	NA	89	0	NA	NA
Mendocino	-27	NA	15	41	NA	NA
Merced	-24	85	19	15	6.4	6.7
Modoc	-20	NA	246	0	NA	NA
Mono	-20	NA	65	0	NA	NA
Monterey	-34	73	16	131	7.7	10.3
Napa	-35	NA	14	0	NA	NA
Nevada	-34	NA	16	12	NA	NA
Orange	-29	71	11	6	6	7.9
Placer	-30	NA	16	17	4.9	8.2
Plumas	-28	NA	59	0	NA	NA
Riverside	-17	38	13	25	7.5	11.9
Sacramento	-14	40	24	7	7.4	11.5
San Benito	-32	NA	12	0	NA	NA
San Bernardino	-20	34	21	8	6.6	13.0
San Diego	-25	56	12	12	8.1	8.7
San Francisco	-30	64	54	19	20.4	17.8
San Joaquin	-22	54	23	31	10.7	8.9
San Luis Obispo	-22	NA	21	18	7.6	10.1
San Mateo	-42	80	11	50	6.3	9.7
Santa Barbara	-26	86	42	16	9.3	10.4
Santa Clara	-38	73	15	32	4.8	7.0
Santa Cruz	-32	NA	21	10	8.9	10.3
Shasta	-7	77	17	0	7.2	12.5
Sierra	-11	NA	396	0	NA	NA
Siskiyou	-24	NA	23	0	NA	NA
Solano	-14	59	11	22	5.4	7.4
Sonoma	-27	100	32	24	8.1	11.1
Stanislaus	-21	74	13	24	10	10.3
Sutter	-24	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tehama	-21	NA	32	18	NA	NA
Trinity	-30	NA	90	0	NA	NA
Tulare	-21	73	24	24	7.4	9.5
Tuolumne	-18	NA	19	0	NA	NA
Ventura	-23	92	12	23	6	9.9
Yolo	-22	NA	74	12	NA	NA
Yuba	-17	NA	20	14	NA	NA

NA: Data is not available, not applicable, or otherwise not suitable for inclusion within the supplement.

9a: Drug-related deaths per 100,000 residents. **9b**: Alcohol-related deaths per 100,000 residents.

County Data Supplement—Criminal Justice

County	Figure Number					
	10	11	12a	12b	13	14
Alameda	2,935	-1.4%	NA	267	61	66
Alpine	NA	NA	NA	NA	76	51
Amador	NA	NA	NA	NA	19	87
Butte	1,773	-35.1	105	219	9	41
Calaveras	NA	NA	NA	NA	17	146
Colusa	NA	NA	NA	NA	30	34
Contra Costa	2,063	-14.2	NA	400	33	78
Del Norte	NA	NA	NA	NA	13	95
El Dorado	1,401	-20.4	79	451	13	43
Fresno	3,926	7.3	20	1,611	19	108
Glenn	NA	NA	NA	1,719	15	330
Humboldt	2,049	-24.2	NA	1,177	11	30
Imperial	2,564	-4.9	NA	NA	19	32
Inyo	NA	NA	NA	NA	26	93
Kern	2,396	-27.2	34	707	15	96
Kings	1,958	NA	388	NA	20	61
Lake	NA	NA	NA	NA	14	64
Lassen	NA	NA	NA	633	40	81
Los Angeles	3,155	-9.6	43	1,074	21	54
Madera	2,608	NA	NA	NA	11	51
Marin	1,138	-2.4	NA	582	27	66
Mariposa	NA	NA	NA	918	29	75
Mendocino	NA	NA	NA	1,268	18	45
Merced	2,641	40.0	47	1,595	9	80
Modoc	NA	NA	12	2,071	29	76
Mono	NA	NA	NA	8,732	48	94
Monterey	1,871	-8.5	NA	NA	31	48
Napa	1,171	-56.3	NA	1,655	22	61
Nevada	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	59
Orange	1,727	-4.4	66	807	23	51
Placer	1,641	-40.0	27	693	23	56
Plumas	NA	NA	NA	325	21	58
Riverside	2,860	-12.6	1	1,259	29	73
Sacramento	3,581	-7.8	12	697	17	80
San Benito	NA	NA	NA	NA	12	58
San Bernardino	3,143	-9.7	NA	399	35	67
San Diego	2,279	2.4	318	200	21	32
San Francisco	3,350	0.4	NA	7	NA	115
San Joaquin	2,895	8.2	33	NA	12	223
San Luis Obispo	1,193	28.3	NA	NA	25	38
San Mateo	1,110	-46.4	NA	NA	43	57
Santa Barbara	1,530	-2.6	0	540	23	47
Santa Clara	1,441	17.0	NA	NA	21	101
Santa Cruz	1,941	27.3	NA	76	8	47
Shasta	2,069	25.7	26	342	23	62
Sierra	NA	NA	NA	NA	30	55
Siskiyou	NA	NA	19	NA	17	48
Solano	2,381	-8.7	19	NA	44	40
Sonoma	1,496	5.8	18	679	26	42
Stanislaus	3,177	41.2	58	NA	17	62
Sutter	NA	NA	NA	554	15	127
Tehama	NA	NA	20	NA	15	33
Trinity	NA	NA	NA	1,211	15	36
Tulare	2,282	-6.5	67	NA	21	75
Tuolumne	NA	NA	NA	281	10	102
Ventura	1,368	-13.8	NA	1,230	55	75
Yolo	2,078	13.7	24	378	36	96
Yuba	NA	NA	NA	69	11	27

NA: Data is not available, not applicable, or otherwise not suitable for inclusion within the supplement.
12a: Jail releases per 10,000 residents. **12b**: Outstanding warrants per 10,000 residents.

County Data Supplement—Roads and Libraries

	Figure Number						
County	**15**	**16**	**17a**	**17b**	**17c**	**18a**	**18b**
Alameda	M	NA	12	7	4	4.1	7
Alpine	L	NA	4	483	25	12.5	10
Amador	H	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Butte	L	NA	8	6	1	2.7	2
Calaveras	M	NA	6	36	2	2.5	3
Colusa	L	NA	7	31	3	6.8	3
Contra Costa	M	>25%	26	10	2	3.2	5
Del Norte	H	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
El Dorado	M	NA	6	12	2	3.0	4
Fresno	M	<10	43	9	1	3.6	2
Glenn	L	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Humboldt	M	NA	11	20	3	2.4	6
Imperial	L	>25	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Inyo	L	NA	7	86	6	3.5	9
Kern	M	>10	28	14	2	3.5	3
Kings	L	NA	6	16	1	2.2	3
Lake	H	NA	4	19	2	2.7	4
Lassen	L	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Los Angeles	H	>25	89	11	3	3.8	4
Madera	H	NA	5	16	1	3.7	2
Marin	L	NA	12	26	5	4.3	9
Mariposa	H	NA	5	55	3	2.9	4
Mendocino	L	NA	6	19	1	2.0	4
Merced	L	NA	16	11	1	2.8	1
Modoc	L	NA	5	75	7	4.2	8
Mono	L	NA	7	172	7	4.1	7
Monterey	L	NA	19	29	3	4.4	4
Napa	H	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nevada	L	NA	4	8	2	1.9	3
Orange	L	<10	28	10	2	3.1	5
Placer	L	NA	11	21	3	3.7	5
Plumas	L	NA	11	71	4	23.3	4
Riverside	M	>10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sacramento	H	>25	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
San Benito	L	NA	2	10	1	2.5	2
San Bernardino	M	>25	30	10	1	3.1	3
San Diego	M	NA	34	12	2	2.4	3
San Francisco	NA	NA	29	14	8	6.7	7
San Joaquin	M	<10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
San Luis Obispo	L	NA	16	16	3	2.5	7
San Mateo	M	NA	13	19	3	4.9	6
Santa Barbara	M	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Santa Clara	L	<10	11	13	6	3.0	15
Santa Cruz	H	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Shasta	L	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sierra	L	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Siskiyou	L	NA	13	51	4	2.7	5
Solano	M	NA	6	6	2	3.0	6
Sonoma	H	>10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Stanislaus	L	NA	13	13	2	3.2	4
Sutter	L	>10	5	15	2	2.3	4
Tehama	L	NA	3	12	1	1.8	3
Trinity	H	NA	3	500	3	2.3	5
Tulare	L	NA	17	13	1	3.2	2
Tuolumne	L	NA	7	21	2	3.6	3
Ventura	L	>10	16	10	2	3.0	3
Yolo	L	>25	8	17	3	2.6	7
Yuba	L	>10	1	6	1	3.3	2

NA: Data is not available, not applicable, or otherwise not suitable for inclusion within the supplement.
17a: Library Outlets. **17b**: Weekly service hours per 10,000 residents. **17c**: Staff per 10,000 residents.
18a: Annual expenditures per circulation. **18b**: Annual circulation per resident.

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