January 13, 2014
Pursuant to Elections Code Section 9005, we have reviewed the
proposed initiative related to property tax allocation (A.G. File No.
13‑0047 Amendment #2-S).
Background
Proposition 98 “Minimum Guarantee” for Schools and
Community Colleges. State budgeting for schools and
community colleges is governed largely by Proposition 98, passed by
voters in 1988. The measure, modified by Proposition 111 in 1990,
establishes a minimum funding requirement for schools and community
colleges, commonly referred to as the minimum guarantee. Both state
General Fund and local property tax revenue apply toward meeting the
minimum guarantee. The Proposition 98 minimum guarantee is determined by
one of three tests set forth in the State Constitution (known as Test 1,
Test 2, and Test 3). These tests are based on several inputs, including
changes in K-12 average daily attendance, local property tax revenues,
per capita personal income, and per capita General Fund revenue. Though
the calculation of the minimum guarantee is formula-driven, a
supermajority of the Legislature can vote to suspend the formulas and
provide less funding than the formulas require.
Supplemental Appropriation Required in Test 3 Years.
When the minimum guarantee is determined by Test 3, the state
is typically required to make a supplemental payment in addition to the
amounts determined by the Proposition 98 formulas. This is because of a
statutory provision related to Proposition 98 that requires K-14 funding
per student to grow at least as fast as per capita General Fund spending
on non-Proposition 98 programs in Test 3 years. Test 3 has been
operative in 7 of the 25 years since Proposition 98 was approved by
voters. A supplemental appropriation was required in each year, although
it was suspended once (in 1993‑94).
The Role of Property Taxes in Education and Local
Government Funding. Because the Proposition 98 minimum
guarantee is met using state General Fund and local property tax
revenues, the state has a substantial fiscal interest in the
distribution of property tax revenue among local governments—schools,
community colleges, cities, counties, and special districts. The county
auditor is responsible for allocating revenue generated from the
1 percent rate to local governments pursuant to state law. All property
tax revenue remains within the county in which it is collected to be
used exclusively by local governments.
Property Tax Revenues Contribute Toward Meeting Specified
Per-Pupil Funding Amounts. School and community college
districts receive a certain level of general purpose per-pupil funding,
as specified in the annual budget act. School districts receive this
funding from a combination of local property tax revenues and state
General Fund revenues, while community college districts receive funding
from local property taxes, student fees, and state General Fund
revenues. If a school or community college district’s local property tax
revenue (and student fee revenue in the case of community colleges) is
insufficient to fund the authorized per-pupil rates, the state provides
General Fund revenues to meet the statutory requirements. Conversely, if
a district’s non-state resources alone exceed the per-pupil rates, the
district does not receive general purpose state aid. This latter type of
district is commonly referred to as a “basic aid” district.
Property Tax Revenue Shifted to Schools in Early 1990s.
In 1992‑93 and 1993‑94, in response to serious budgetary
shortfalls, the state permanently redirected almost one-fifth of total
statewide property tax revenue from cities, counties, and special
districts to school and community college districts. Under the changes
in property tax allocation laws, the redirected property tax revenue is
deposited into a countywide fund for schools, the Educational Revenue
Augmentation Fund (ERAF). The property tax revenue from ERAF is
distributed to nonbasic aid schools and community colleges, reducing the
state’s General Fund obligations.
In 2004, Some Property Tax Revenue Shifted Away From
Schools. In 2004, state voters approved Proposition 57, a
deficit-financing bond to address the state’s budget shortfall. The
state enacted a three-step approach—commonly referred to as the triple
flip—that provides a dedicated funding source to repay the deficit
bonds:
- Beginning in 2004-05, one-quarter cent of the local sales tax
effectively was redirected to the state to repay the
deficit-financing bond.
- During the time these bonds are outstanding, city and county
revenue losses from their reduced sales taxes are replaced on a
dollar-for-dollar basis with property taxes shifted from ERAF.
- School and community college district property tax losses from
the redirection of ERAF to cities and counties, in turn, are offset
by increased state General Fund.
The VLF Swap Also Resulted in Some Property Tax Revenues
Being Shifted Away From Schools. The vehicle license fee
(VLF)—a tax on vehicle ownership—provides revenue to local governments.
In 1999, the state began reducing the VLF rate and backfilling city and
county revenue losses from this tax reduction with state aid from the
General Fund. The 2004-05 budget package permanently replaced the state
VLF backfill by redirecting to cities and counties some property tax
revenue from ERAF and, if necessary, nonbasic aid school and community
college districts—a transaction known as the “VLF swap.” In 2004-05,
cities and counties did not experience a change in overall revenue due
to the VLF swap, as the amount of property tax shifted to them was equal
to the VLF backfill amount. In subsequent years, state law specifies
that each local government’s VLF swap payment grows based on the annual
change in its assessed valuation. As assessed valuation typically grows
more quickly than VLF revenue, the vast majority of cities and counties
benefit fiscally from the VLF swap. Annual statewide VLF swap payments
now are roughly $2 billion (around 50 percent) greater than the VLF
revenues lost by cities and counties. Similar to the triple flip, school
and community college districts’ property tax revenue losses are made up
with increased state General Fund.
Minimum Guarantee “Rebenched” to Ensure Property Tax
Shifts Do Not Affect Schools and Community Colleges. Because
the amount of local property tax revenues can sometimes affect the
Proposition 98 calculation, shifting the allocation of property
taxes can unintentionally increase or decrease the state’s overall
funding requirement to schools and community colleges. To ensure that
these property tax shifts have no effect on the total amount of funding
schools and colleges receive, the minimum guarantee is rebenched any
year in which the state adopts policy changes that affect the amount of
property taxes that schools or colleges receive. (Technically, the
state’s General Fund Proposition 98 obligation is rebenched/adjusted to
account for the shift in the amount of property tax revenues going to
schools and colleges.)
Some County Offices of Education (COE) Receive
Comparatively More Property Taxes. Similar to school
districts, state law dictates that each COE receive a specified level of
funding from a combination of local property taxes and state aid. A few
COEs—Placer, San Mateo, and Santa Clara—receive property taxes in excess
of their specified funding level. The county-auditor controller deposits
these excess property taxes into a county account called the
Supplemental Revenue Augmentation Fund (SRAF). Revenue deposited in the
SRAF are distributed to trial courts within the county, offsetting state
costs.
Proposal
Eliminates the VLF Swap. Effective July 1,
2015, the measure ends the shift of property taxes from ERAF and school
and community college districts to cities and counties under the VLF
swap.
Establishes a New VLF Backfill Mechanism.
Beginning in 2015‑16, the measure requires the State Controller to
transfer monthly from the state General Fund to a new VLF Backfill Fund
the amount of funding necessary to fully reimburse city and county VLF
revenue losses due to the reduction in the VLF rate from 2 percent to
0.65 percent. The State Controller would distribute to each city and
county a portion of these backfill funds roughly equal to the decrease
in VLF revenue to the city or county resulting from the VLF rate
reduction.
Prohibits Shifts of Property Tax Revenues Away From
Schools. The measure prohibits the Legislature from
reallocating, transferring, or otherwise reducing the amount of property
taxes allocated to educational entities—school districts, community
college districts, ERAF, and COEs.
Requires COE’s Excess Property Tax Revenue to Be Spent on
Child Care. The measure eliminates the requirement that a
COE’s excess property tax revenue restricted funds be deposited into
SRAF. Instead, the measure would require county auditor-controllers to
deposit these funds into a countywide account—known as the Child
Development Fund—to be used to fund child care and development services
within the county.
Fiscal Effect
City and County Revenues. By eliminating
the VLF swap, the measure decreases annual city and county property tax
revenues by about $7 billion, beginning in 2015‑16. About $4.5 billion
of this revenue loss, however, would be offset by increased state aid.
On net, therefore, the measure decreases annual city and county revenue
by around $2.5 billion in 2015‑16. In future years, city and county
revenue reductions likely would grow because the state aid provided to
cities and counties likely would grow more slowly than city and county
property tax revenue losses.
School and Community College Funding. The
effect of the measure on school and community college districts would
depend on whether the 2015‑16 minimum guarantee is determined by Test 3
and the state provides a supplemental appropriation. If this does not
occur—probably the most likely scenario—the measure would have no effect
on the minimum guarantee and the increase in school property tax
revenues would be fully offset by a reduction in state General Fund
support for schools and community colleges. In this case, the measure
would reduce state education costs by about $7 billion per year,
beginning in 2015‑16, but would not affect total school and community
college district resources.
Conversely, if the 2015‑16 minimum guarantee is determined by Test 3
and the state provides a supplemental appropriation, total school and
community college funding would increase. This is because the shift in
property taxes required by this measure would free up additional General
Fund revenues that the state could use for various purposes and the
supplemental appropriation would ensure that school and community
college funding per student grows at least as fast as per capita General
Fund spending on non-Proposition 98 programs. The increase in school and
community colleges from the supplemental payment could range from the
low hundreds of millions to several billion dollars. This supplemental
payment would, in turn, increase school and community college funding in
future years.
State Costs. The measure increases state
costs to aid cities and counties by about $4.5 billion annually,
beginning in 2015‑16. This increased state cost would be offset by a
reduction in state aid for school and community college districts. The
net fiscal effect for the state would depend on whether a Test 3
supplemental appropriation was provided. If the Test 3 supplemental
appropriation was not provided, the $4.5 billion in increased state aid
to cities and counties would be more than offset by reduced state
education costs of $7 billion, resulting in annual savings of about
$2.5 billion. In future years, state savings probably would grow because
the cost to provide aid to cities and counties likely would grow more
slowly than the offsetting reductions in state aid for school and
community college districts. Conversely, if a Test 3 supplemental
appropriation were provided, some or all of these net state savings
would be offset. In some circumstances, the state cost to provide a Test
3 supplemental appropriation could be greater than $2.5 billion,
resulting in a net increase in state costs of several hundred million
dollars or more annually.
Summary of Fiscal Effect
- Net decrease in city and county revenue of about $2.5 billion
per year, beginning in 2015‑16.
- Uncertain impact on annual state costs ranging from savings of a
few billion dollars to costs of a few billion dollars, beginning in
2015‑16.
- Possible increase in school and community college funding.
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