A Review of the CalSTRS Funding Plan: Theoretical Investment Gains Have Shifted Unfunded Liabilities to Districts

Feb 2, 2016 - As described in our second post , the state’s share of CalSTRS’ unfunded liabilities is based on an estimate of what CalSTRS’ funding shortfall would be today if the state made different decisions about teacher pensions in the past.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3334

CalSTRS Funding: An Update

May 5, 2017 - For example, if CalSTRS ’ real world portfolio grows by $10  billion, the calculation gives the state the benefit of a roughly $11  billion gain. Of course, the opposite is true as well. When CalSTRS records an investment loss —as they did in 2015 ‑ 16 —the loss to the theoretical investment portfolio is larger than the real world loss, making the state share of
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3662

A Review of the CalSTRS Funding Plan: CalSTRS Funding Plan Relies on Abstract Calculation

Feb 2, 2016 - In general, the state will pay for these smaller theoretical unfunded liabilities —as determined by the calculation —while districts will pay the difference between total real world unfunded liabilities and the state ’s share.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3333

A Review of the CalSTRS Funding Plan: Funding Plan May Not Meet Principle of “Shared Responsibility”

Feb 2, 2016 - As we described in our third post , the abstract calculation central to the funding plan implementation gives the state the benefit of theoretical investment gains that do not exist in the real world.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3337

A Review of the CalSTRS Funding Plan: State’s Future Responsibility for CalSTRS Uncertain

Feb 2, 2016 - In our third post , we showed how the funding plan’s key calculation gives the state the benefit of theoretical investment gains that do not exist in the real world. For example, if CalSTRS’ real world portfolio grows by $10 billion, the calculation gives the state the benefit of a roughly $12 billion gain.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3336

MOU Fiscal Analysis: Bargaining Unit 2 (Attorneys and Hearing Officers)

Aug 29, 2016 - While the administration ’s plan seems to be to keep making pay-as-you-go benefit payments for many years, the new arrangement would begin to fund “normal costs ” each year for the future retiree health benefits earned by today ’s Unit 2 workers.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3495

MOU Fiscal Analysis: Bargaining Unit 12 (Craft and Maintenance)

Jun 27, 2025 - Lower Costs Today in Exchange for Higher Costs Later. Suspending both the employer and employees ’ contributions to prefund OPEB reduces costs today but contributes to a significant and growing unfunded liability and creates substantial risk that the benefit will not be fully funded by 2047.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/5060

Refocusing the Workers’ Compensation Subsequent Injury Program

Jul 10, 2025 - With Influx of Claims Driving Backlog, Today ’s SIBTF Claimants Might Expect to Wait Ten Years. Injured workers must finalize their subsequent injury workers ’ compensation case before proceeding with their SIBTF claim for additional benefits.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/5062

MOU Fiscal Analysis: Bargaining Unit 6 (Corrections)

Sep 7, 2023 - In the case of retiree health benefits, the state pays a percentage of pay towards normal cost (specified in labor agreements and matched by employees) to prefund the benefit and it pays the unfunded liability on a “pay-as-you-go ” basis where it pays out the claims cost for existing retirees.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4800

MOU Fiscal Analysis: Bargaining Unit 16 (Physicians, Dentists, and Podiatrists)

Jul 14, 2025 - Lower Costs Today in Exchange for Higher Costs Later. Suspending both the employer and employees ’ contributions to prefund OPEB for two years reduces costs today but contributes to a significant and growing unfunded liability.
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/5064